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Education as a Right of National Citizenship Under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Education is a prerequisite to American democracy 1  The
democratic republic set forth in the Constitution created the necessity
for public education because an educated populace is essential to self-
governance.' According to Thomas Jefferson, "free citizens, in order
to remain free, must be educated."3  The United States Supreme
Court recognized this principle in its 1954 landmark decision, Brown
v. Board of Education.4 The Brown Court affirmed the principle that
education is essential to aid the public in performing important civic
responsibilities, including voting and serving in the armed forces. 5
For these reasons the Court found education to be "perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments. '6 Accordingly,
the Court indicated that the right to an education, "where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms."7  Numerous Supreme Court decisions since
Brown have recognized that education is vital to the maintenance of
1. See THE CONSTITUTION AT WORK: PUBLIC VIRTUE, THE EDUCATED CITIZEN
AND THE CONSTITUTION (Jan. 13, 2002), at http://www.constitutioncenter.org/sections/
work/virtue.asp (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter THE
CONSTITUTION AT WORK] ("At the core of the framers' conception of a democratic
representative government lay a virtuous public, citizens prepared to exercise their
constitutional rights and responsibilities in an informed and meaningful manner.").
2. Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 131, 182, 187-88 (1995); see Elizabeth Reilly, Education and the Constitution:
Shaping Each Other and the Next Century, 34 AKRON L. REV. 1, 1 (2000).
3. THE FOUNDERS' ALMANAC: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE NOTABLE EVENTS,
GREATEST LEADERS & MOST ELOQUENT WORDS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 93
(Matthew Spalding ed., 2002) [hereinafter THE FOUNDERS' ALMANAC] (noting that
Thomas Jefferson advocated for free public education for all elementary school children).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
5. See id. at 493.
6. See id. The Court elaborated,
[c]ompulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship ... [and] it is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Id.
7. Id. (emphasis added).
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our democratic government. Contemporary educational policies and
structures, however, ignore this seminal principle. American leaders
and politicians boast that the United States is a land of possibility, but
our current education system actually reinforces a class structure
whereby different opportunities are available based on socio-
economic status.' The Supreme Court, while explicitly recognizing
the important role of education in our society, has also failed to
mandate educational adequacy, let alone equality, under the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10
8. See infra notes 134-51 and accompanying text.
9. James Wilson, Why a Fundamental Right to a Quality Education Is Not Enough,
34 AKRON L. REV. 383, 390 (2000).
10. In Brown I, for example, the Supreme Court espoused the ideal of equal
educational opportunity, but it failed to define the meaning of equality. While Brown I
opened the door to judicial oversight of public education on equal protection grounds, it
had an important omission. Chief Justice Warren could not convince his colleagues that
all children had a "fundamental right" to an education. See Wilson, supra note 9, at 387.
Subsequent decisions in turn refused to mandate equality in education. Brown l's impact,
accordingly, has been doctrinally confined mainly to the issue of race. See, e.g., Keyes v.
Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (holding that a "finding of intentionally
segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system creates a
presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious");
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971) (holding that
desegregation must be achieved in each of a district's schools to the greatest extent
possible); Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968)
(holding that schools must dismantle segregated systems "root and branch" and that
desegregation must be achieved with respect to facilities, staff, faculty, and extracurricular
activities). The focus of desegregation during the 1970s and 1980s became the physical
integration of black and white students, "through such measures as busing, school choice,
magnet schools, use of ratios, redrawn school district boundaries, mandatory and
voluntary intra- and interdistrict transfers, and consolidation of city districts with suburban
districts." Jeanne Weiler, Recent Changes in School Desegregation, Clearinghouse on
Urban Education Digest (Apr. 1998), at http://www.ed.gov/databases/ERIC-Digests/
ed419029.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). See generally Swann, 402
U.S. 1 (finding where de jure segregation existed, school districts must integrate by
whatever means necessary, including busing); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 376 U.S. 960
(1964) (ruling that school districts cannot close public schools to escape desegregation);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (ruling that states may not delay integration because
of threats of violence); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II) (mandating
enforcement of the decision in Brown I by federal district courts). This approach is
illustrated in the Supreme Court's treatment of funding disparities:
Tragically, the federal judiciary's focus on race frequently came at the expense of
class-based concerns. Instead of requiring a high-quality education for
everyone-something that could be partially measured through such basic
techniques as class size, teacher payrolls, types of classes, and classroom
support-the Court made desegregation its immediate goal and school busing its
primary remedy.
Wilson, supra note 9, at 388. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), for example, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the claim that
equal protection mandated equal funding across public school districts within a state,
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Court has never, however, directly addressed the question of
whether the right to education is protected by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the early
history of the Privileges or Immunities Clause indicates that the
clause was designed to protect rights of national citizenship,"' the
clause is potentially a more appropriate constitutional source for
protecting the right to education than the Equal Protection Clause. 2
This is not to say, however, that the case in favor of recognizing a
right to education under the Privileges or Immunities Clause is
without obstacles. This provision became a relatively dead letter for
protecting constitutional rights after the Supreme Court's 1835 The
Slaughter-House Cases3 decision. 14 In the recent case of Saenz v.
Roe, 5 however, the Court has signaled that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has a renewed vitality, thereby paving the way for
later courts to recognize the right to education under this provision. 6
The implications of recognizing the right to education include, for
example, that the failure of states to provide an adequate education
to their citizens is unconstitutional. Because inadequacy is closely
tied to resources, this conclusion has particular resonance in the area
of public school funding. Whether adequacy is measured by inputs
(educational opportunities) or outputs (educational outcomes), the
lack of proper funding results in many of our nation's poor students
not receiving a basic minimum level of education. 7
All fifty states guarantee their citizens the right to a public
education. 8 All citizens, however, do not necessarily receive an
holding that the right to education was not a fundamental right under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at
30.
11. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
12. Professor Philip B. Kurland advocated that we should not be concerned with
equality, but rather with quality of education. Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or
Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 419 (1973)
("For equality can be secured on a low level no less than a high one."). He believed that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause provided the proper vehicle for securing "adequate
and appropriate educational opportunity." Id.
13. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
14. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
15. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
16. See infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. What constitutes an "adequate" or
"basic minimum level" of education is beyond the scope of this article. For an analysis of
various definitions of adequacy, see Kristen Safier, Comment, The Question of a
Fundamental Right to a Minimally Adequate Education, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 993, 1012-15,
1018-20 (2001).
18. See LAWRENCE KOTIN & WILLIAM E. AIKMAN, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 34 (1980) (noting that education is not just
1288 [Vol. 81
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education of equal quality. 19 The disparity in the quality of education
stems primarily from the unequal funding of public schools.2' To
understand why local funding of our public school system contributes
to the inadequacy of education for some students and is therefore
potentially unconstitutional under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, one must first explore how the
funding system operates. The major source of revenue for education
is comprised of property taxes levied on residential and commercial
properties within individual school districts' boundaries.21 Wealthy
districts with high property values are able to generate revenue for
public educational facilities and curricula that far exceeds that
generated by less affluent districts.2  Though poorer districts tax
residents at higher rates, they are unable to raise the same level of
funds as wealthy districts. 3 Compounding this problem is the fact
that in wealthier districts there is usually only one family living per
unit of taxable property,24 while in poorer districts, multiple families
live in apartment complexes that comprise a single taxable unit.
provided, it is mandated in all states except Mississippi). Mississippi reenacted its
compulsory school attendance statute in 1987. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (1999).
19. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
20. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 54 (1991) (providing an extensive survey of the unequal and unfair
conditions of inner-city schools); John C. Reitz, Public School Financing in the United
States: More on the Dark Side of Intermediate Structures, 1993 BYU L. REV. 623 (noting
that funding of "public school districts has been considered vital to ensure local control
over schools").
21. See, e.g., STATE AID TO SCHOOLS: A PRIMER, The University of the State of
New York State Education Department (Dec. 2000), at http://stateaid.nysed.gov/primer98.
pdf (describing school financing in New York) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). Public school funding generally derives from three sources-the federal
government, state governments, and local property taxes. See Public School Funding:
Where Do School Districts Get Their Money, and How Do They Spend It?, at http://www.
pcpe.org/infoseries/funding.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). School districts typically receive only 3.5% of their revenue from
the federal government. See id. State funding programs often attempt to equalize revenue
across districts by providing more aid to poorer districts and less to wealthier districts, but
the percentage of state support of school operating costs continues to decrease. Id. The
decline in state support "effectively shift[s] a greater funding obligation onto the local tax
base." Id. (noting that for more than twenty years the portion of public school expenses
subsidized by state aid in Pennsylvania has decreased from 50% to 35.6%).
22. See KOZOL, supra note 20, at 54-55.
23. Id. (asserting that poor communities typically place a high priority on education
and therefore tax themselves at a higher rate than wealthier districts).
24. See, e.g., EDUCATION FOR ALL-FACING THE CHALLENGES OF NEW JERSEY'S
PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM (Jan. 13, 2002), at http://www.princeton.edu/-lawjourn/Fal197/
lIlmorley.html (explaining problems with local property tax funding of public schools) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
25. Id.
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Thus, the ratio of students to taxable property in poorer districts is
much higher, resulting in less money generated per student each
year.26
The federal income tax scheme exacerbates the funding
disparities. The federal government allows taxpayers who itemize to
deduct taxes paid to state and local governments from federally
taxable income.27 The tax deduction essentially functions as a public
education subsidy by the federal government z.2  Direct federal aid to
schools is consistently less than ten percent of the total funding they
receive, but this subsidy creates an incentive for individuals who
itemize to spend more on public education.29  While poorer
homeowners receive this subsidy, the amount of money flowing back
to them from the tax deduction is less because their property tax
contributions are less.30 Many poorer homeowners also take the
standard deduction, as opposed to itemizing, and therefore do not
receive any benefit from this indirect government subsidy.3
Those who support localized funding for public education argue
that it is essential to local control over education.32 Under a localized
funding scheme, voters in each school district dictate their own
priorities with regard to education and set the property tax
accordingly. 33 Many believe that along with the control over funding
comes control over the content and structure of educational
services.34  This argument, however, ignores the reality. The
26. Id. In some cities as much as thirty percent or more of the population may not be
subject to property taxes. See KOZOL, supra note 20, at 55 (citing a study by Jonathon
Wilson, former chairman of the Council of Urban Boards of Education). This is compared
to as little as three percent in adjacent suburbs. See id.
27. Susanna Loeb & Miguel Socias, Federal Contributions to High-Income School
Districts: The Use of Tax Deductions for Funding K-12 Education 1 (2001) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1-2.
30. Id. at 2-3.
31. See id. at 9 (noting that the higher the income of the taxpayer, the greater
probability of that taxpayer itemizing).
32. See Reitz, supra note 20, at 627-28.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., id. (examining the misconceptions of localized educational funding).
"[L]ocal school boards [also] provide a 'school for citizenship,' training citizens to run the
larger democracies of state and federal governments by first giving them opportunities to
manage an important affair on the local level." Id. at 627. Another argument advanced
by proponents of local control is that pressure from taxpayers ensures that residents have
incentive to monitor local public school expenditures and quality of services provided.
Education Funding: Fair or Flawed?, Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission 22 (Oct.
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Illinois Commission].
This argument ignores the fact that residents have an independent reason for closely
[Vol. 811290
2003] ED UCA TION: A RIGHT OF CITIZENSHIP? 1291
unfortunate fact is that the effectiveness of poor residents' control
over their public education under this system is greatly limited by
their lack of financial resources. The result is that for the poorer
districts the notion of local control is no more than "cruelly
illusory."35  Individuals in these districts are restrained from
controlling the quality of the education they provide because of the
low ceiling on their school expenditures.36
Poorer school districts thus lack the funding to adequately
educate their students.37 Funding, or lack thereof, is a significant
contributor to low academic achievement.38 Concentrated poverty
levels are related both to less educational opportunities and lower
educational outcomes. As a Harvard University study concludes,
"[s]chools with high poverty concentrations have lower school test
score averages, few advanced courses, fewer teachers with credentials,
inferior courses and levels of competition, and send fewer graduates
monitoring the performance of local schools-namely that the quality of education
provided directly impacts their children.
35. Reitz, supra note 20 at 630. To illustrate the reality of the disparities, in 1995-
1996, New Jersey's per pupil expenditures ranged from a low of $5,900 in a poor district to
a high of $11,950 in one of the most affluent districts. Elizabeth Jean Bower, Recent
Development, Answering the Cail: Wake County's Commitment to Diversity in Education,
78 N.C. L. REV. 2026, 2040 (2000). New York's expenditures ranged from $7,525 to
$13,146. Id. Per-pupil spending in Illinois spanned from $3,000 to $15,000. Id. In Savage
Inequalities, Jonathan Kozol described a New Jersey public high school where lab rooms
had no equipment, the boiler was broken, there were no working computers and the drop-
out rate exceeded fifty-eight percent. KOZOL, supra note 20, at 138-40 (exposing the
inequities in American public school systems). This school was in a district with a per-
pupil expenditure level of $4,000. Id. at 149. That same year, a nearby school district
spent over $6,000 per student and other New Jersey districts spent upwards of $8,000. Id.
There is evidence that this trend continues. In 1998, school district per-pupil expenditures
in the Chicago, Illinois region ranged from $4,517 to $13,366. Illinois Commission, supra
note 34, at 11.
36. Reitz, supra note 20, at 630. The system of localized funding actually results in an
overall under-funding of education. If schools were funded on a state-wide basis with
equal distribution across districts, "it seems likely that the average voters would not be
satisfied with the level of school funding until their students-and hence all students-
received at least the same funds as the 'average student' now receives." Id. at 631-32
(claiming the current system underfunds public schools). An increase in the overall level
of spending would be required to accomplish this equal distribution. Id. at 632.
37. For a discussion of the literature on the correlation between expenditures on
education and academic achievement, see MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL
POLICY AND THE LAW 596-99 (3d ed. 1992); David Card & Alan B. Krueger, The
Changing Educational Quality of the Workforce: School Resources and Student Outcomes,
559 ANNALS 39 (1998).
38. See Durham Public Education Network, Closing the Achievement Gap: A Call for
Community Action: Summary Report, THE HERALD-SUN NICHE MAGAZINES,
SUMMARY REPORT (Spring 2002).
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on to college."3 9  For example, forty percent of students in
Washington D.C.'s poorest districts fail to finish high school.4" Forty
percent of high school students in Philadelphia's poor districts score
below the fifteenth percentile on standardized tests as compared to a
mere six percent of students from Philadelphia's wealthy districts.4'
More than fifty percent of Baltimore's low-income district students
fail to pass a basic math skills exam in the ninth grade. 2 These are
just a few examples of how our current education system is failing our
nation's poorest youth.
The current funding system of public schools results in vast
disparities in the per pupil expenditures on education provided to our
nation's youth. 3 Does this disparity, however, rise to the level of a
constitutional problem? The United States Supreme Court addressed
this question in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.' Parents of children enrolled in Texas schools brought a
class action suit on behalf of school children throughout the state who
39. Gary Orfield & John T. Yun, Resegregation in American Schools, A Report of The
Civil Rights Project, Harvard University, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/
publications/resegregation99/resegregation99.html (1999) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) [hereinafter The Civil Rights Project]. This problem is inextricably linked to
issues of race, which is why the focus on the quality of education for all students is so
important in the wake of granting unitary status to many school districts and the potential
resegregation of public schools. With the granting of unitary status, "the reality is that
many urban students return to schools that are segregated and inferior." Weiler, supra
note 10. Racially isolated schools "for all groups except whites are usually schools with
high concentrations of poverty." Resegregation in American Schools, The Civil Rights
Project, Harvard University, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/alerts/reseg.html
(last visited Feb. 28, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter
Resegregation of American Schools]. The Harvard Project on Desegregation reported that
intensely segregated African-American schools are fourteen times more likely to be high
poverty schools. The Civil Rights Project, supra. See generally RACE, POVERTY, AND
AMERICAN CITIES (John Charles Boger & Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1996) (providing a
collection of essays that explores the relationship between race and poverty in America's
urban centers), The educational achievement of racial minorities continues to lag behind
that of white students. Weiler, supra note 10. In North Carolina alone, more than half of
the 400,000 black students failed standardized math and reading tests, whereas eighty
percent of white students passed both exams. Bower, supra note 35, at 2040.
40. See Safier, supra note 17, at 996.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. To illustrate this reality, note that a
number of state supreme courts have found that inequalities in funding of public schools
violate their state constitutions because students within their states are receiving vastly
different levels of education. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J.
1990); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
44. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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resided in school districts having low property tax bases, claiming that
the school finance system was unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause.45 Texas's system of funding public education was
based largely on local property tax revenue.46 This system enabled
wealthy school districts to spend more on education than poor
districts, even though the individual properties in poor districts were
taxed at a higher rate.47 The level of disparity in spending led the
district court to conclude that Texas's system of public school
financing violated the Equal Protection Clause.48 The Supreme Court
rejected this conclusion, however, holding that "the Equal Protection
Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages. ' 49
The Court then addressed the parents' claim that citizens have a
fundamental right to education under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
noted that education is essential to effective exercise of a democratic
political process. "[T]he electoral process, if reality is to conform to
the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate: a voter
cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought
processes have been adequately developed."5 The significance of
education to individuals and society, however, did not persuade the
Court to conclude that a right to education was fundamental.
According to the Court, "the importance of a service performed by
the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as
fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection
Clause."51 Applying only rational basis review, the Court found that,
although Texas's system resulted in unequal expenditures, such
disparities were not "so irrational as to be invidiously
45. Id. at 5-6.
46. Id.
47. See id. The Court illustrated the disparity by comparing two school districts
within the same county. The town of Edgewood, Texas had an assessed property value of
$5,960 per pupil, the lowest in the metropolitan area. Id. at 12. Its tax rate on assessed
property was the highest in the metropolitan area. Id. 'A revenue of only $26 per pupil
was generated in 1967-1968. Id. In contrast, Alamo Heights, Texas had an assessed
property value of $49,000. Id. at 13. Its tax rate on assessed property was significantly
lower than Edgewood's, yet it generated $36 per pupil for the same academic year. Id.
48. Id. at 16-17.
49. Id. at 24. The Court refused to recognize wealth as a suspect classification and
therefore applied only rational basis review to find a legitimate state objective. Id. at 28-
29.
50. Id. at 36.
51. Id. at 30, 33-34 (noting that courts must assess "whether there is a right to
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution").
20031 1293
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discriminatory. 5 2 The Rodriguez Court, however, did not foreclose
all future Constitutional challenges to educational funding systems.
The majority noted that there was no claim that any student was
being absolutely deprived of an education,53 suggesting that it would
be receptive to a claim where a system failed to provide basic
educational skills "necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech
and of full participation in the political process."54
Although the Rodriguez Court denied that a fundamental right
to education exists under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, another avenue pertinent to this inquiry has
not been explored. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,55 specifically in its protection of rights of
national citizenship,56 may implicate the question of whether
inadequate funding is constitutionally permissible.57 At the time
Rodriguez was decided, this clause lay dormant after its
"evisceration" by the Supreme Court in The Slaughter-House Cases.8
Since Rodriguez, however, developments in this area of jurisprudence
suggest that the Privileges or Immunities Clause has a renewed
vitality.59
Before addressing the specifics of education as a right of national
citizenship under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it is useful to
first explore the history and development of this constitutional
provision. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
52. Id. at 23.
53. Id. at 55.
54. Id. at 37. In a dissenting opinion, Justice White expressed concern over the vast
disparity in educational opportunities: "[T]his case would be quite different if it were true
that the Texas system, while insuring minimum educational expenditures in every district
through state funding, extended a meaningful option to all local districts to increase their
per-pupil expenditures and so improve their children's education .... " Id at 64 (White,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall emphatically claimed that education was far too vital to
Americans to allow states to discriminate. Id. at 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. See infra note 103.
57. Perhaps Professor Philip B. Kurland best summarized the view that the claim is
for adequate and appropriate educational opportunities and this claim "derives more
cogently from concepts of privileges and immunities rather than equality of treatment."
Kurland, supra note 12, at 419.
58. 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1872) (holding that a state's grant of a monopoly did not abridge
the plaintiffs' privileges or immunities even if it denied them the right to practice their
trade); see Gregory S. Wagner, Comment, A Proposal for the Continued Revival of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Invalidate the Alcohol
Direct Shipment Laws, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 876 (2001).
59. See infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
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or immunities of the citizens of the United States .... "60 The framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that this provision protected
"great principles of English and American liberty."61 These included
the common law natural rights-embodied in the Bill of Rights- plus
other fundamental rights.62 The framers were guided in the meaning
of these rights by Justice Washington's interpretation of the Article
IV, section 2, Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States
Constitution in Corfield v. Coryell.63 Article IV, section 2 states:
"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States."'  In Corfield, Justice
Washington defined privileges and immunities under Article IV,
section 2, as those "which are, in their nature, fundamental; which
belong of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which
have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states
which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free,
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment was passed in the
aftermath of the Civil War. National Archives and Records Administration, Cornerstones
of American Democracy (1998) (indicating that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified
on July 9, 1868). In examining the issues that led to the Civil War, the framers believed
that an increase in national power was needed to protect the rights of individual citizens
against infringement by the states. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 128 (Swayne, J.,
dissenting). Legal scholars, however, have extensively examined and debated the meaning
of this clause since its ratification. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14-30
(1980) (claiming that the clause invites the Court to give it content by reference to process
values implicit in constitutional structure of government); John Harrison, Reconstructing
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1473-74 (1992) (claiming that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause is an anti-discrimination provision); Christopher S.
Maynard, Note, Nine-Headed Caesar. The Supreme Court's Thumbs-Up Approach to the
Right to Travel, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 340 (2000) (claiming that the "anti-
discriminatory school maintains that privileges and immunities are readily identifiable as
those which are granted by each individual state to its own citizens."). But see RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 134-56 (1977) (claiming that the clause constitutionalized only the rights set
out in the Civil Rights Act of 1866); Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 63, 63-67 (1989) (stating that the Privileges or Immunities Clause encompasses
natural rights and this is the best protection of limited government and separation of
powers).
61. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1866) (quoting Sen. Cowan).
62. See id.
63. 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). One of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Senator Howard, indicated that the Privileges or Immunities Clause had a
dual purpose: It protected the type of fundamental rights described in Corfield v. Coryell
and provided absolute protection for "the personal rights guarantied [sic] and secured by
the first eight amendments of the Constitution." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2765 (1866) (quoting Sen. Howard).
64. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § II.
1295
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independent, and sovereign. "65 Analogously, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
protect rights of citizens against infringement by the states.66 The
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not explicitly list the
rights they deemed fundamental; they merely defined the framework
as "the fundamental rights enjoyed by free persons in a democratic
society. ' '67  Thus, the framers created a minimum standard below
65. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52 (stating that the fundamental principles were too
numerous to enumerate); see also James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435, 442
(1985) (stating that the privileges or immunities were natural rights).
66. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement by Rep. Bingham)
(stating that section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment "would allow Congress to protect by
national law the privileges and immunities of citizens and the inborn rights of persons
when the same were denied or abridged by any state ...."); Wagner, supra note 58, at 870.
Unlike the Article IV, section 2, Privileges and Immunities Clause, however, the source of
the constitutional right for section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was national
citizenship rather than state citizenship. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple. Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a
Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 427 (1990) (claiming
many supporters "advocated that the Fourteenth Amendment include broad language that
they (mistakenly) hoped would be explicated later and clarified by either the federal
judiciary or the Congress as the fundamental rights enjoyed by free persons in a
democratic society").
An 1871 interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by the Ohio Supreme Court indicated that the Clause guaranteed equality of
rights to the citizens of a state, "as one of the privileges of citizens of the United States."
State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 210 (1871) (finding that the law in
question recognized the right "to equal common school advantages, and secures to
[African-Americans] their equal proportion of the school fund"). The court found that no
infringement on equal rights of citizens arose in classifying the youth of the state for
school purposes. Id. at 211 (noting that the law did not cause a "substantial inequality of
school privileges" among children of different classes).
Commentators, however, have provided different interpretations of the framers'
original intent regarding the purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Raoul
Berger argues that the sole purpose of the provision was to transform the Fourteenth
Amendment so that it constitutionalized guarantees contained in the Civil Rights Act of
1866. BERGER, supra note 60, at 20. Other commentators claim that the 39th Congress
intended the Privileges or Immunities Clause to incorporate the Bill of Rights. See
HORACE E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 19-20, 57-59,
152-53 (1908). Still others argue that the clause protects a broad category of rights that is
not necessarily limited to those enumerated in either the Civil Rights Act or the Bill of
Rights. See Commager, Historical Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, in THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 14, 24 (B. Schwartz ed., 1970) (claiming that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause invites the Court to give it content by reference to extraconstitutional
principles of natural right).
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which the states could not go, but above which the states could add
other rights, provided all citizens enjoy equal access to them.68
Despite the original understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, virtually
nullified the clause just five years after it was ratified.69  The
Slaughter-House Cases70 arose after Louisiana granted a monopoly to
a slaughterhouse company."1  Several butchers brought suit
challenging the grant of the monopoly, arguing that the state law
impermissibly violated their right to practice their trade. 72  The
butchers invoked many of the provisions of the recently adopted
constitutional amendments, including a claim that the monopoly
abridged their privileges or immunities as citizens.73 The Supreme
Court narrowly construed all of the constitutional provisions at issue
and rejected the plaintiffs' challenge to the legislature's grant of a
monopoly.74 Justice Miller, writing for the majority, indicated a
distinction between citizenship of the United States, referred to in
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and citizenship of the
states.75  The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protected only those rights already explicitly protected
by the Federal Constitution.76  According to the Court, the Clause
was not intended to invalidate state laws that infringed upon
individual rights; rather it was the states themselves that were
responsible for defining and securing those rights.77 The Court
concluded that the right to practice a trade belonged to citizens of the
states and should be "left to the State governments for security and
protection, and not by this article placed under the special care of the
Federal government .... 78
68. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1760 (1866) (providing Senator
Tumbull's argument that states can grant or reduce rights as long as they do not dip below
the minimum of the "great fundamental rights").
69. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 41 (1872); Wagner, supra note 58, at
876.
70. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
71. Id. at 59. The legislature gave a monopoly in the livestock landing and the
slaughterhouse business for the City of New Orleans to Crescent City Livestock Landing
and Slaughter-House Company. Id. The law required that the company allow any person
to slaughter animals in the slaughterhouse for a fixed fee. Id.
72. Id. at 60.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 76-81.
75. Id. at 73-75.
76. Id. at 76.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 78.
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The Slaughter-House Cases dissenters noted that the majority's
construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause robbed the clause
of all meaning.7 9 They interpreted the clause to encompass rights not
otherwise explicitly provided for in the Constitution, arguing for
federal protection of national rights inherent to all people." Justice
Field asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment reflected the belief in
"a free government, in the American sense of the term, under which
the inalienable right of every citizen to pursue his happiness is
unrestrained, except by just, equal, and impartial laws.""s  Justice
Bradley claimed that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to provide federal protection against state intrusions of
individual rights.8 2 The dissenters' interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause arguably parallels the original framers' conception
of the Clause; they failed to convince a majority of the Court,
however, and the clause was rendered a dead letter.
Since 1873, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment remained virtually unused by the Supreme
Court as a source of constitutional protection. 3 In a 1999 decision
involving the right to travel, 4 however, the Supreme Court
resurrected the Privileges or Immunities Clause to invalidate a
California law involving the distribution of welfare benefits to new
79. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Field lamented:
If [the Privileges or Immunities Clause] only refers, as held by the majority of the
court ... to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specially
designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of
the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing,
and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people in its passage.
Id.
80. Wagner, supra note 58, at 883.
81. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 93 (Field, J., dissenting) (claiming that the
Fourteenth Amendment "was adopted to ... place the common rights of American
citizens under the protection of the National government").
82. Id. at 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
83. But see Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 436 (1935) (invalidating a state tax that
applied solely to income and dividends earned outside the state under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause). The Supreme Court overruled this decision, however, just five years
later in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 92 (1940) (holding that the right to practice
one's trade is not a right of national citizenship under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause). In several instances, a minority of the Court has relied on the clause. See, e.g.,
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162-65 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (claiming the
right to jury trial is a privilege of national citizenship); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
170 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring) (claiming right of interstate travel is a privilege of
national citizenship); Hague v. Comm. For Indep. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 512 (1939) (stating
that the right to assemble and discuss national issues is a privilege of national citizenship).
84. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501-03 (1999).
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residents.85 The California Legislature passed legislation in order to
reduce its welfare budget.86 The legislation limited the welfare
benefits of new residents to the level of benefits they would have
received in their prior state of residence.87 The Supreme Court found
that the legislation violated the citizens' right to travel.88 The
majority explained that one of the components to the right to travel
encompassed the right of "travelers who elect to become permanent
residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State."89
The Court declared that this component of the right to travel
stemmed from the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9" Quoting Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion in The
Slaughter-House Cases, the Court found that the states did not have
power to restrict the rights of citizenship to any classes or persons.9"
That the right to travel was affected only incidentally by the unequal
distribution of welfare benefits did not sway the majority's view that
an infringement of a constitutional right had occurred.92
85. Id.
86. ld. at 493.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 498 ("[T]he right is so important that it is 'assertable against private
interference as well as governmental action ... [It is] a virtually unconditional personal
right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.' " (internal citation omitted)).
89. Id. at 500. The first two components are the right to enter and leave another state
and the right to be treated as a welcome visitor when temporarily present in another state.
Id.
90. Id. at 503 ("[M]ost notably expressed in the majority and dissenting opinions in
the Slaughter-House Cases, it has always been common ground that this Clause protects
the third component of the right to travel." (citation omitted)). For an explanation of the
origins of the right to travel, see infra note 99.
91. Id. at 503-04. Justice Bradley, in dissent, used even stronger language to make the
same point:
The states have not now, if they ever had, any power to restrict their citizenship
to any classes or persons. A citizen of the United States has a perfect
constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim
citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the
whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him in that right.
Id. (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 504. The Court did not employ the same fundamental rights analysis as that
traditionally used under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It did
not address whether the statute posed a sufficient impingement or undue burden on the
right. For an illustration of the traditional fundamental rights analysis, see Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (establishing a fundamental right to keep
one's family together); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that there is a
fundamental right to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding a
fundamental right to purchase contraceptives); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (finding that the Court has recognized a right of parents to control the upbringing
of their children).
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California argued that the statute was justified by fiscal
considerations and alleged a state-wide savings of $10.9 million per
year.93 The Court rejected this justification because discrimination
among equally eligible citizens on the basis of their state of prior
residence was an impermissible means to accomplish the purpose,
even if legitimate.94 The majority ultimately found that citizens, rich
or poor, have the fundamental right to choose where to reside, but
states do not have the right to select citizens.9" The Court noted that
the Fourteenth Amendment was " 'framed upon the theory that the
peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in
the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division.' "96
Saenz does not provide much guidance as to the circumstances
under which the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment should be applied in the future. Many commentators
note that the majority's employment of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is likely limited to the right to travel.97 If, however, the
Supreme Court in Saenz signaled a desire to revitalize the Privileges
or Immunities Clause as a constitutional source of rights of national
citizenship,98 then the recognition of a right to education under this
93. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506.
94. Id. at 506. Although it is unclear what standard of review was employed, the
Court indicated that neither rational basis nor intermediate scrutiny sufficed. Id. at 504.
95. Id. at 510-11.
96. Id. at 511 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)).
97. See generally Nicole I. Hyland, Note, On the Road Again: How Much Mileage Is
Left on the Privileges or Immunities Clause and How Far Will It Travel?, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 187, 253 (2001) (concluding that the right to interstate travel is best protected under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause); April D. Lashbrook, Note, Back from a Long
Vacation: The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Saenz v.
Roe, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 481, 510-11 (2001) (attempting to harmonize Saenz v. Roe with
the Court's previous right to travel jurisprudence); Maynard, supra note 60, at 298-99
(arguing that the Court in Saenz simply applied equal protection analysis used in
traditional right to travel cases). But see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 378 (1997) (claiming "the words of the [Privileges or
Immunities Clause] suggest that it clearly protects rights-those that can be deemed
privileges or immunities of citizenship-from state interference"); see also Duncan E.
Williams, Note, Welcome to California, Tom Joad: An Historical Perspective on Saenz v.
Roe Stirring the Privileges or Immunities Clause from Its Slaughter-House Slumber, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 88-89 (2001) (noting that Saenz's real importance is in the
fact that it reveals that all nine justices "appear ready to reconsider the Privileges or
Immunities Clause").
98. Rights of national citizenship in this context should be distinguished from personal
rights. The Supreme Court has recognized personal rights that are not explicitly provided
for in the text of the Constitution under the Due Process Clause. Such rights include the
right to marry, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), the right to custody of one's
children, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982), the right to keep one's
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provision logically follows. The roots of this position are grounded in
Justice Washington's analysis in Corfield v. Coryell and in Justice
Bradley's dissenting opinion in The Slaughter-House Cases. As
explained previously, Corfield defined Article IV, section 2 privileges
and immunities as fundamental, belonging of right to every citizen of
the Union.99 These rights were not limited to an enumerated list or
confined to rights already existing under the Constitution. 100 Drafters
family together, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977), the right
to control the upbringing of one's children, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923), the right to procreate, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942), the right
to purchase contraceptives, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965), and the
right to have an abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
Rights of national citizenship, on the other hand, may include the right to vote, see
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964), the
right to access to the courts, see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S 817, 828 (1977), and the right to
interstate travel, see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). Although the Court,
prior to Saenz, has characterized these rights as personal ones, protected by the Due
Process Clause, they are more aptly labeled rights of citizenship because of their
importance to the maintenance of our democracy.
Saenz did not specifically indicate that rights would be re-categorized and
protected by different clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The basis for this
conjecture is the fact that the Supreme Court previously declared the right to travel to be a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (declaring unconstitutional laws that
imposed one-year residency requirement in the state as a prerequisite for eligibility for
welfare). The Court claimed that the law discriminated as to who can receive welfare
benefits based on duration in the state; as such, the Court said that the law imposed a
burden on those who have recently traveled and migrated to the state. See id. at 638.
Thus, although Saenz did not deny new residents any welfare benefits, but merely
provided benefits for the first year of residence at the same level as a new resident's
previous state of residence provided, Shapiro set up a framework for the Supreme Court
to invalidate California's welfare program under the Due Process Clause. The Court
instead turned to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, thus indicating a purposeful
revitalization of this clause. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999); see supra note 85 and
accompanying text. Thus, the Privileges or Immunities Clause provides a vehicle for
protecting citizenship rights that are fundamental to the maintenance of our democracy.
But see Timothy S. Bishop, Comment, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 142, 150 (1984) (noting
that in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the legislature sought only to protect civil rights, not political rights).
99. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
100. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). The Court
has provided little guidance as to identifying privileges and immunities of citizenship
under Article IV, section 2. See Baldwin v. Mont. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371,
380 (1978) (acknowledging that "the contours of [the clause] are not well developed").
The Privileges and Immunities Clause can be used to challenge state and local laws that
discriminate against out-of-staters with regard to the exercise of constitutional rights. See
Canadian N. Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 560-63 (1920) (finding right of access to the
courts of the state is right protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Blake v.
McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256-61 (1898) (holding that right to own and dispose of property is
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of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment indicated that Corfield's
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause should serve
as a guide to understanding the Privileges or Immunities Clause." 1
Bradley's dissent in The Slaughter-House Cases, in turn, is important
in that it indicated that United States citizenship gives rise to certain
"incidental rights, privileges, and immunities of the greatest
importance."" 2 Bradley believed that a citizen of the United States
who claimed citizenship in any state of the Union, must enjoy equality
of rights with every other citizen of that state.0 3 The right to
education fits into the framework set out by Washington and Bradley
for determining rights of national citizenship-namely rights that
were recognized by the framers (and continued to be recognized
throughout history) as vital to the maintenance of our nation.104
protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause). More recently, in Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court held that a state could not limit the ability of out-of-staters
to obtain abortions in the state. Id. at 200. What is interesting about Doe is that the Court
not only established that a state cannot discriminate with regard to access to the
constitutionally protected right of abortion, but it expressly forbade states from
discriminating against out-of-staters with regard to access to medical care, even though
there is no constitutional right to medical care. Id. at 200-01.
101. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502
n.15 (1999) (noting that the framers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause modeled the
clause after the Article IV, section 2 Privileges and Immunities Clause); Id. at 526-27 n.6
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is regarded as the
precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment and Congress relied heavily on Corfield in
drafting the legislation); Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to
Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education
Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550, 614 (1992) (noting that framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment repeatedly referred to Corfield "as explanatory of the sorts of rights
guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause").
102. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 116 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 113 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("Citizenship of the United States ought to be,
and, according to the Constitution, is, a sure and undoubted title to equal rights in any and
every State in this Union ....").
104. There may be another argument for finding the current public school system
funding scheme unconstitutional under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The Court in
Saenz found California's providing different levels of welfare benefits to citizens within its
borders based on length of residency violated the national right to travel under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999). Specifically, the
Court found the third component of the right to travel to be the right to be treated equally
to other citizens of one's state of residence. Id. at 500-03. Analogous to welfare benefits,
the states guarantee public education to residents. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text. Under the current funding scheme, education benefits are provided unequally across
school districts within a state. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text. Thus, as
with welfare benefits, providing unequal education benefits arguably violates the national
right to travel. Educational benefits, however, can be distinguished from the welfare
benefits at issue in Saenz. There, the welfare scheme was directly tied to length of
residence. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493. Thus, residents received varying levels of benefits
based on how long they had lived in the state. Funds provided for education, on the other
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The framers envisaged the right to travel as integral to the
development and growth of our nation.105 Likewise, the framers
recognized the necessity of an educated public to the functioning of a
successful democracy. 10 6 At the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, the framers may have disagreed as to the structure or
content of education, but they agreed on its importance to the success
of a republic. 7 George Washington claimed that "[t]he best means of
hand, are not related to length of residence. The disparities are based on the local tax
base. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text. Although this could vary over time,
the spending levels are not fixed at different levels by the State. There is a far more
tenuous connection to travel. Furthermore, one could argue that if society requires states
to provide all benefits equally to residents, states will go bankrupt or decide to provide no
benefits at all.
105. The United States Supreme Court has declared the right to travel to occupy "a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been
firmly established and repeatedly recognized." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757
(1966). The Court in Saenz found the right to travel to be firmly embedded in its
jurisprudence. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504-05. Thus, the framers of the Constitution
envisioned the concept of unimpeded travel of citizens throughout the United States as
essential to the preservation of the nation. This concept is reflected in numerous judicial
opinions throughout our history. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)
(finding that denying right to vote to new residents for durational time period impeded
fundamental right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (invalidating
complete denial of welfare benefits to new citizens as violative of right to travel); Guest,
383 U.S. at 757 (1966) (finding right to travel encompassed the right to use highway
facilities). But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (upholding one-year residency
requirement before filing for divorce as not an infringement on right to travel).
106. See Reilly, supra note 2, at 2-3. As one commentator explained:
But it is not only our political system that is dependent upon a viable and
successful educational system. Our economic system also proclaims its reliance
upon well-trained and educated workers. And our social system rests on two
largely accepted goals that each require access to education-the "melting pot"
which requires the successful absorption of diverse immigrant populations into a
pluralistic social and cultural structure, and "upward mobility" which requires
the permeability of class barriers. Both goals are achieved substantially through
the education system.
Id.; see also CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC 15 (Eric Foner ed., 1983)
(claiming that founders envisioned the purpose of public education to promote national
identity and social order); Bitensky, supra note 102, at 550 (claiming that the "freedom of
mind, made possible by education has long been extolled by the nation's intelligentsia as
an integral and quintessential component of American national identity."); Charles N.
Quigley, Education for Democracy: A Plan to Require Civics and Service to Build
Tomorrow's Citizens, Blueprint: Ideas for a New Century, at http://www.ndol.org/
blueprint (last visited Feb. 14, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (noting
that leaders such as Jefferson, Madison, and Adams recognized that "a vibrant democracy
must rely on the knowledge, skill, and virtues of its citizens and their elected officials").
"Education that imparts that knowledge and skill fosters those virtues is essential to the
preservation and improvement of American constitutional democracy and civic life." Id.
107. See Ross J. Pudaloff, Education and the Constitution: Instituting American
Culture, in LAWS OF OUR FATHERS 26-27 (Ray B. Browne & Glenn J. Browne eds., 1986)
("By a necessary definition, a republican education was a mass education ....").
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forming a manly, virtuous, and happy people will be found in the right
education of youth. Without this foundation, every other means, in
my opinion, must fail."' °8 Thomas Jefferson believed that education
was necessary to combat the ignorance he believed was the foe of
self-government. 19 An enlightened citizenry was hailed by Jefferson
as an indispensable safeguard of democracy.110 "Education would
provide the basic tools-knowledge, academic principles, and
courage-to 'enable every man to judge for himself what will secure
or endanger his freedom.' " Jefferson deemed education so vital to
the maintenance of our democratic society that he proposed
extending free education to all children in the state of Virginia." 2
Benjamin Franklin believed in the importance of educating citizens to
be efficient tradesmen and vigilant democratic citizens." 3
"Democratic citizens must cultivate certain personal virtues to be
sure, but they must also become aware of the social preconditions of
liberty, and learn to recognize the threats to it.""' 4 Thus, he was
concerned with the enlightenment of the entire populace of
Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, the Congress of the Confederation
reserved parcels of land in every township for the purpose of providing public schools. See
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 (1986).
108. George Washington, Letter to George Chapman, December 15, 1784, in THE
FOUNDERS' ALMANAC, supra note 3, at 150.
109. Dorothea Wolfson, Thomas Jefferson, in THE FOUNDERS' ALMANAC, supra note
3, at 77, 89-90 (claiming that Jefferson believed that "free citizens, in order to remain free,
must be educated").
110. See Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1778),
reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 365, 372-78 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
"If a nation expects to be ignorant-and free-in a state of civilization, it expects what
never was and never will be." Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Colonel Charles Yancey,
January 6, 1816, in THE FOUNDERS' ALMANAC, supra note 3, at 149; see also Molly
O'Brien, Free at Last? Charter Schools and the "Deregulated" Curriculum, 34 AKRON L.
REV. 137, 141 (2000) ("Jefferson thought that citizens must be educated in order to vote,
to protect liberty, and to be vigilant against government corruption.").
111. THE CONSTITUTION AT WORK, supra note 1. Noah Webster also commented on
educating youth in America:
It is an object of vast magnitude that systems of education should be adopted and
pursued which may not only diffuse a knowledge of the sciences but may implant
in the minds of the American youth the principles of virtue and of liberty and
inspire them with just and liberal ideas of government and with an inviolable
attachment to their own country.
Noah Webster, On the Education of Youth in America, 1790, in THE FOUNDERS'
ALMANAC, supra note 3, at 150-51.
112. Wolfson, supra note 110, at 92.
113. Steven Forde, Benjamin Franklin, in THE FOUNDERS' ALMANAC, supra note 3, at
45, 55-56 (claiming that Franklin rejected the European model because it catered to the
needs of a privileged class).
114. Id. at 56-57.
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democratic virtues.'15 An educated public was also essential to James
Madison's conception of a well-functioning democratic process." 6
According to Madison, "the best service that can be rendered to a
Country, next to that of giving it liberty, is in diffusing the mental
improvement equally essential to the preservation, and the enjoyment
of the blessing." '117 He espoused a system of deliberate democracy" 8
that was designed to allow new perspectives and information to
influence citizens' judgments on potential courses of action."9
Collective and individual decisions would be made on exposure to
information and varied perspectives. 2 ' As Professor Sunstein
explains, "[w]e might therefore understand the Madisonian system to
build on the basic democratic commitment to education for all."''
The belief that education is necessary to ensure the survival of
the nation is thus well-founded. l2 A leading educational theorist,
John Dewey, noted, "a government resting upon popular suffrage
cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their
governors are educated."'23 Dewey asserted that democracy is more
than just a form of government, it is an association of individual
citizens.12  Education instructs citizens how to interact with other
115. Id. at 557.
116. As Sunstein explained:
We know enough to know that lack of interest is often a result of inadequate
education, perceived powerlessness, unsatisfactory alternatives, or a belief that
things cannot really be changed. Indifference to politics is frequently produced
by insufficient information, the costs of gaining more knowledge, poor
educational background ....
Id. at 21.
117. James Madison, Letter to Littleton Dennis Teackle, March 29, 1826, in THE
FOUNDERS' ALMANAC, supra note 3, at 149.
118. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 18-21
(1993).
119. Id. at 19.
120. Id. "Moreover, the system of deliberate democracy is premised on and even
defined by reference to the commitment to political equality." Id. at 20.
121. Id. at 21.
122. An infrastructure and legal regime for universal schooling of our nation's children
was put in place before the turn of the century. IRA KATZNELSON & MARGARET WEIR,
SCHOOLING FOR ALL: CLASS, RACE, AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL
28 (1985). Currently, every state has enacted laws mandating the education or school
attendance of children. See Bitensky, supra note 102, at 551.
123. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 101 (1917). Education prepares
young citizens for "the roles and responsibilities they must be ready to take on when they
reach maturity." See Education for Democracy, at http://www.infed.org/biblio/b-dem.htm
(last visited Feb. 27, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (internal quotes
omitted).
124. DEWEY, supra note 123, at 101.
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members of the association.' This is "equivalent to the breaking
down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept
men from perceiving the full import of their activity. 12 6  Dewey
stressed that unlike a society marked off into distinct classes where
the only concern is education of the elite, a democratic society is
mobile and readily open to social change.'27 Education provides all
members of society the valuable skills of personal initiative and
adaptability so they will not be overwhelmed by the ever-changing
cultural, economic, or political landscape.'28 To focus only on the
educational needs of some children, at the expense of others, will
actually lead to the destruction of democracy.2 '
Thus, an educated citizenry is necessary to ensure democracy
works. The need for education encompasses not only voting but also
comprehends that citizens have the requisite level of knowledge in
order to exercise other constitutional rights, such as freedom of
speech and assembly. It recognizes that, in a democracy, citizens
exert a powerful force in promoting societal change, through voicing
opinions and working together to address the social and economic
problems that face our nation. It understands that if democracy is to
be effective in the promotion of collective self-interest, individuals
must have the ability to ascertain what their self-interests entail.
Finally, an educated populace is a check against tyranny. Although
Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California3 '
was addressing freedom of speech, his words apply equally to the
need for education. As he wrote, "[t]hose who won our
independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary."'' The founders
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 102. Dewey advocated that a Democracy should be open to revision in
"light of continued social experience." JAMES BOWEN & PETER R. HOBSON, THEORIES
OF EDUCATION: STUDIES OF SIGNIFICANT INNOVATION IN WESTERN EDUCATIONAL
THOUGHT 166-67 (2d ed. 1987).
128. DEWEY, supra note 123, at 101. In fact, it can be argued that education actually
aids citizens in becoming catalysts of social change.
129. John Dewey, The School and Society, in JOHN DEWEY ON EDUCATION:
SELECTED WRITINGS 295 (Reginald D. Archambault ed., 1964). "Only by being true to
the full growth of all the individuals who make it up, can society by any chance be true to
itself." Id. See generally Sherry, supra note 2, at 131 ("The extent to which we take the
commitment to democracy seriously is measured by the extent to which we take the
commitment to education seriously." (quoting Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of
Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671, 1697 (1990))).
130. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
131. Id. at 375.
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recognized that "the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people.' 132 They believed in the power of educated reasoning applied
through the process of popular government.33
For all these reasons, the Supreme Court has already
acknowledged the importance of education in the development and
maintenance of our society. As discussed supra, in Brown v. Board of
Education,'34 the Supreme Court espoused the ideal of equal
educational opportunities because of the importance of education to
the basic functioning of our democracy.'35 Even prior to Brown the
Court recognized acquisition of knowledge to be a matter of supreme
importance 136 and education to be one of the first objects of public
care. 137 Following Brown, the Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the
importance of public schools in preparing individuals for participation
as citizens.138 In Abington School District v. Schempp,'39 Justice
Brennan stated that Americans regard public schools as vital civic
institutions for the preservation of a democratic government. 140  In
Wisconsin v. Yoder,'4' the Court explained that education is necessary
to prepare individuals to participate in society. 142 In Bethel School
District v. Fraser,43 the Court described the role and purpose of the
American public school system as preparing " 'pupils for citizenshipin the Republic.... It must inculcate the habits and manners of
132. Id.
133. Id. at 375-76.
134. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
135. Id. at 493.
136. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
137. Interstate Consol. St. R. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907). State courts
also have recognized the importance of education for citizenship. See, e.g., Trs. of the
Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805) (describing the right to education as "a
right highly esteemed in all civilized nations ... a right of acquiring knowledge and good
morals, which have always been deemed most conducive to the happiness and prosperity
of a people"). Professor Suzanna Sherry claims that this statement reflected "a wealth of
American republican thinking on education and citizenship." Sherry, supra note 2, at 187
("Under this view, a nation cannot prosper, nor can liberty be protected, without a good
and virtuous citizenry, which in turn depends on an education stressing both knowledge
and virtue.").
138. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 (1979). In Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265
(1986), for example, the Court noted that even prior to the ratification of the Constitution,
the Congress of the Confederation passed an ordinance to reserve a certain lot of land in
every township for the maintenance of public schools in order to promote public
education. Id. at 268.
139. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
140. Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Pierce v. Soc. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
517 (1925) (explaining that schools foster patriotism).
141. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
142. Id. at 213, 237-39.
143. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as
indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community
and the nation.' "I' Justice Marshall remarked in Milliken v.
Bradley'45 that education is vital to the ability of individuals to live
together, which is essential to the survival of our nation. 146  Most
recently, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,47 Justice Thomas claimed
that public schools promote democracy and an egalitarian culture. 48
Even in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,'4
where the Court held that education is not a fundamental right, 50 the
Court acknowledged that education is essential to the effectiveness of
a democratic political process. 5' Thus, as did the framers, the
144. Id. at 681 (alteration in original) (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
145. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
146. Id. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court severely restricted the
ability of courts to fashion interdistrict desegregation orders).
147. 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2483 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that "[w]hile in
theory providing education to everyone, the quality of public schools varies significantly
across districts").
148. Id. Other branches of the federal government have explicitly recognized the
importance of education to our nation. For example, President George H. W. Bush
convened an education summit with all fifty state governors in 1989 because of a
recognition that many American students failed to make adequate academic gains. Joint
Statement Following the Education Summit with Governors in Charlottesville, Va., 25
WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOc. 1487 (Sept. 28, 1989). At the end of the conference, the
President and governors issued a "Jeffersonian compact to enlighten our children and the
children of generations to come." Id. at 1279. More recently, President George W. Bush
signed into law the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in an effort to help close the
achievement gap among our nation's youth. See Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(2002); Policy Statement of No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: Reauthorization of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act Legislation and Policies Website, U.S.
Department of Education, at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/esea/ (last visited on Feb.
27, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
149. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
150. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. Note, however, that many state
courts have found a fundamental right to education under their state constitutions. See,
e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790
S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec'y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 552 (Mass. 1993).
151. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 113.
In a 1982 decision, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Supreme Court
reiterated that there is no fundamental right to education under the United States
Constitution; however, the Court cited the importance of education to society in
invalidating a state law that denied educational opportunities to illegal aliens. Id. at 221
("Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting
impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction."). The majority
found that the State had acted to burden the educational opportunities of a disadvantaged
group of children, who need an education to become full participants in society. Id. at
221-22. The majority found:
In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural
heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront
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Supreme Court consistently has recognized the essential role of
education in maintaining the fabric of American democracy.
A potential objection to recognizing a right to education, unlike
the right to travel, is that the right to education is an affirmative right.
Although the right to travel is not provided for in the text of the
Constitution, it is distinguishable from a right to education because
the right to education is a positive right, imposing an affirmative
obligation on the states. The right to travel is only implicated
negatively, that is, it is only asserted when states attempt to abridge
the right. 5 This is far different than requiring a state to provide a
certain level or quality of education to its citizens. In fact, the
Supreme Court has been very reluctant to impose affirmative
obligations on the states.53 There is some precedent, however, for
implying positive rights from constitutional guarantees. The
Constitution provides for elections for members of Congress and for
the president,'54 but it does not explicitly require elections for state
and local officers. 55 Despite this Constitutional silence, the Supreme
to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause:. the abolition of
governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the
basis of individual merit.
Id. Unfortunately, only six years later, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S.
450 (1988), the Supreme Court underscored its holding in Rodriguez that education is not
a fundamental right. Id. at 458 (finding that requiring fees for transportation to public
schools did not violate Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The
Court distinguished Plyler claiming that it involved unique circumstances in which
children were being punished for the illegal conduct of their parents. Id. at 459. In a
dissenting opinion, however, Justice Marshall noted the "extraordinary nature of this
interest" in education. Id. at 469. "Since Brown, we frequently have called attention to
the vital role of education in our society. We have noted that 'education is necessary to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system
.... .Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)). He claimed that
education is often the only means through which the poor can become full participants in
society. Id.
152. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999).
153. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of
laws that denied public funding for medically necessary abortions except where necessary
to save the life of the mother); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (upholding
limitations on Medicaid funds for abortion).
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreme Court indicated that the
pursuit of knowledge may have a constitutional dimension, finding that a statute
prohibiting teaching foreign languages to students was unconstitutional as violative of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 401, 403. This is a negative
right, however, in that it simply forbids a state government from impeding individuals in
their quest for information.
154. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
155. The Supreme Court has allowed state and local governments to select their public
officials through means other than elections. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395
U.S. 621, 629 (1969) (indicating that it is constitutional to have an elected city council
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Court has imposed an affirmative obligation on states to ensure that
the right to vote is safeguarded because it is regarded as essential to
our democratic society. 56 Because of this, the Court has determined
that any laws that deny or limit the ability of citizens to vote must
meet strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."7 Analogously, the right to education is
essential to our democratic society and should qualify for the same
exception to the general reluctance to impose affirmative obligations
on the states.158
choose the mayor who has broad administrative powers); Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231,
235 (1966) (upholding the ability of a state to have its legislature choose its governor when
no candidate received a majority of the popular votes in an election).
At least one commentator argues that Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution
requires states to provide elections for state and local officials but the Supreme Court has
determined that this argument presents a nonjusticiable political question. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 711.
156. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on
that right strike at the heart of representative government."). Similarly, the Supreme
Court has found that there is a "fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts."
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). But see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 360, 363
(1996) (undercutting that right by applying only rational basis review to restrictions on
prisoners' access to courts, but accepting the statement that there is a right to access to the
courts). As further support for the proposition that it may impose affirmative obligations,
in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), the Supreme
Court declared that states had an affirmative obligation to integrate students in segregated
school districts. Id. at 437 (holding that schools must dismantle segregated systems "root
and branch" and that desegregation must be achieved with respect to facilities, staff,
faculty, and extracurricular activities). These cases suggest at least that the Supreme
Court is willing to impose affirmative obligations on states in appropriate circumstances.
See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990)
(critiquing the notion that the Constitution only imposes negative obligations on
government and not affirmative duties).
157. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530 (1974) (holding that the
government must provide absentee ballots to jail inmates not being held in their county of
residence, if they have no other means of voting); Kramer, 395 U.S. at 633 (holding that
voting cannot be restricted to those who owned taxable real property or had children
enrolled in local public schools); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666
(1966) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause is violated by poll taxes); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1963) (finding equal protection requires that all voting
districts be approximately the same population size); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
347 (1960) (finding denial of equal protection when city borders were redrawn to exclude
black voters). But see Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 70 (1978)
(holding that a city may limit voting in city elections to its residents); Lassiter v.
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959) (upholding statute that
conditioned voting eligibility on a person's ability to read or write any section of the
Constitution in the English language).
158. An argument also could be made that the right to travel is directly fundamental to
the maintenance of our nation, whereas education is only indirectly important because of
its role in producing an informed citizenry. In setting out the structure of our democratic
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In Saenz, the Supreme Court resurrected the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a source for the
protection of rights of national citizenship. Although the Court did
not explicitly identify the rights of national citizenship beyond the
right to travel, the legislative history of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause suggests that these rights are defined by their importance to
the survival of our nation. Education is such a right. Implicit in our
democratic republic is the requirement of an educated populace to
support and maintain the government. Our founders understood that
an enlightened citizenry was necessary in order for democracy to
flourish, and the interrelationship between education and democracy
continues to be seen as inextricably intertwined. The recognition of
the right to education under the Privileges or Immunities Clause
suggests that public school systems that fail to provide an adequate
education to our nation's youth are unconstitutional. Thus, because
educational inadequacy is often linked to lack of financial resources,
public school funding systems that fail to provide sufficient financial
resources are constitutionally suspect. Although in the context of a
school funding case, the Supreme Court held that education is not a
fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause, Saenz signals
that school funding schemes may be vulnerable to challenge under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. If so, then the promise of
Brown, that no children shall be denied educational opportunity, and
the accordant ability to fully participate in the American dream, may
finally be realized.
KARA A. MILLONZI
government, however, the framers recognized the fundamental role of an educated
citizenry. It was implicit in the design. See supra notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
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